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The Consequences of 
Recent Job Growth on Older 
Low-Income Workers
William M. Rodgers III
Rutgers University and the National Poverty Center
As of April 2008, the U.S. labor market was eight and a quarter 
years into the current business recovery cycle, yet only about 7 million 
jobs had been created, not even half the average growth that occurred 
during the four previous recoveries.1 Although modest job growth has 
emerged since August 2003, the questions that Freeman and I asked in 
our earlier work (Freeman and Rodgers 2005a,b) still remain appro-
priate: Why has the macroeconomy produced historically slower job 
growth? Why has the job market recovered at a much slower pace than 
during previous recoveries? Does this slower pace of job growth signify 
a major shift in the link between the labor market and the business cycle 
or does it represent a temporary break in historical patterns, possibly 
stemming from the oddities of the 1990s boom?
Understanding the sources of this slower job growth is of particu-
lar importance for American families, policymakers, practitioners, and 
academics. During the recovery, productivity growth, fi scal stimulus, 
and interest rates have been much more favorable than in previous re-
coveries. Yet growth in Gross Domestic Product has not been strong 
enough to generate job growth larger than or even similar to previous 
recoveries. Some cite job growth only since August 2003 to downplay 
the recovery’s slower pace of growth, but even from August 2003 to 
January 2008, average monthly growth in total nonfarm employment 
has been 142,000, just above the 130,000-job monthly increase that is 
needed to accommodate labor force growth.2 Even though the national 
unemployment rate is within the range of estimates that are considered 
to be the non-accelerating infl ation rate of unemployment (NAIRU), 
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the employment-population ratio (the share of civilian population that 
is employed) is lower than when the U.S. unemployment rate was at a 
similar level during the 1990s boom.3
Because the labor market continues to play catch-up with past re-
coveries, many minority workers and workers with the fewest skills 
who benefi ted from the 1990s boom are having diffi culty maintaining 
their gains. This is true for African Americans and new job entrants 
(Freeman and Rodgers 2005a,b). It is also true for the nation’s fast-
est-growing minority group, Latinos. The lack of strong job creation 
has given rise to growing economic insecurities for Latinos (Gonzalez 
2002; Kochhar 2003; Suro and Lowell 2002). Depending on their par-
ticular demographic characteristics, this has meant fewer jobs, lower 
wages, less health insurance, and declining pensions (Rodgers and 
Freeman 2006).
The analysis in this chapter focuses on describing the experiences 
of older Americans, defi ned as being of age 50 years and over. In a typi-
cal recovery, the labor market should become even more favorable to 
older workers than to the working population at large, since they have 
greater levels of education and experience than younger workers. How-
ever, an extensive body of literature on job displacement has shown that 
both the absolute and the relative probability of displacement among 
older workers have risen over the past several decades, regardless of the 
point in the business cycle (Gardner 1995; Peracchi and Welch 1994; 
Rodriguez and Zavodny 2003; Van Horn et al. 2005). A variety of fac-
tors have been identifi ed as the causes, including corporate restructur-
ing and rising health care and pension costs. The common rationale for 
the greater displacement has been fi rms’ efforts to trim the higher-cost 
portions of their labor forces so that they can compete in global labor 
and product markets.
Given this structural increase in displacement and the slower pace 
of job growth, I explore whether the latter has adversely affected the 
employment outcomes of older workers. Has the recovery’s slower pace 
of job growth put older workers at greater economic risk by not provid-
ing employment opportunities that offset the structural increase in the 
displacement? During previous recoveries, strong job growth provided 
older workers with opportunities, helping to moderate displacement’s 
effects.
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The results of my analysis show that
• Job growth continues to lag behind the growth that occurred dur-
ing previous business cycles. As of April 2008, 6.9 million new 
jobs had been created, compared to 14.4 million during the 1990s 
recovery and 19.0 million during the recovery that started in No-
vember 1982. 
• The slower pace of growth is potentially due to three new trends: 
shifts in investment, rising health-care costs, and fi scal policy 
choices.
• The slower pace of employment growth has adversely affected 
older Americans. Full-year employment and private health in-
surance and pension coverage have either stagnated or trended 
downward, and the most consistent and strongest evidence of de-
cline is among men aged 50 to 54.
• Older men’s stagnation and losses are primarily due to their 
decline in manufacturing, transportation, and public utility em-
ployment, sectors of the economy that have lost jobs during the 
recovery. Older women’s losses were dampened by their dispro-
portionate presence in the education and health services sector, 
the recovery’s fastest growing sector.
• Rising economic insecurity for older low-income families goes 
well beyond declining labor force attachment. Private-sector 
health insurance and pension coverage rates both fell. These ero-
sions come on top of already signifi cantly lower wages, health-
insurance coverage, and pension coverage than enjoyed by the 
general working-age population.
A FRAMING OF THE CURRENT BUSINESS CYCLE: 
THE CATCH-UP ECONOMY
A puzzle for analysts and policymakers has emerged since Novem-
ber 2001. Figure 2.1 shows that during the current recovery, macroin-
dicators have been at extremely favorable growth levels. First, produc-
tivity growth has averaged 2.6 percent, compared to 1.7 percent during 
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the 1990s recovery. Second, as measured by the federal budget defi cit 
as a share of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), fi scal stimulus has 
increased. During the 1990s recovery, the federal government ran sur-
pluses of 1.5 percent of GDP. Today, we are in a defi cit of 2.2 percent of 
GDP. Thus, the government shifted from taking in more revenue than 
its expenditures, to spending more than its revenue. Third, interest rates 
have been at record lows compared to past recoveries: the average for 
the federal funds rate is at 2.9 percent during the current business cycle, 
compared to 4.6 percent during the 1990s business cycle. Yet real GDP 
growth does not exceed growth during previous recoveries.
Furthermore, the growth in GDP has not been large enough to gener-
ate large and widespread job growth. To illustrate this point, Figure 2.2 
contrasts (on a month-by-month basis) the November 2001–April 2008 
recovery with both the 1990s recovery and the two previous recover-
ies that lasted as long as the current one. Even with the acceleration 
in job creation since August 2003, the 2001 recovery has had slower 
employment growth than all previous recoveries since 1960, including 
the 1990s recovery, when employment also took a long time to recover. 
After 78 months of this recovery, or by April 2008, 6.9 million new jobs 
Figure 2.1  Macroeconomic Indicators for the Current Recovery and 
the 1990s Recovery, Showing Slower GDP Growth Despite 
Extremely Favorable Conditions
SOURCE: Author’s tabulations of data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the Bureau 
of Economic Analysis, and the Federal Reserve Board of Governors.
Rodgers chapter.indd   16 9/10/2008   1:29:58 PM
Consequences of Recent Job Growth on Older Low Income Workers   17
had been created, compared to 14.4 and 19.0 million during the recov-
eries that followed the 1980s and 1990s recessions.4
The slower pace of job growth is broad-based. In fact, employment 
in many private-sector industries, such as manufacturing, in which 
older men are concentrated, remains well below where it was at the 
start of the recovery.5 By April 2008, employment was 13.0 percent 
lower in durable manufacturing and 15.9 percent lower in nondurable 
manufacturing than when the recovery began (Figure 2.3). In contrast, 
by the seventy-eighth month of the previous recoveries, combined, 
nondurable and durable manufacturing had expanded by an average of 
1.4 and 7.1 percent, respectively. Even with the recovery, employment 
remained 14.8 percent lower in the broad sector labeled information, 
which was supposed to produce good jobs to replace declining employ-
ment in traditional manufacturing. During earlier recoveries this sector 
had grown at an average rate of 15.7 percent. 
Figure 2.2  A Comparison of Cumulative Growth during the 2001 
Recovery, the 1991 Recovery, and the Two Previous 
Recoveries
NOTE: Each series is benchmarked to the start of its recovery as defi ned by the NBER 
Business Cycle Dating Committee. Figures are through April 2008, the 78th month 
of the current recovery. 
SOURCE: Nonfarm Payroll Establishment data, U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of 
Labor Statistics. 
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Figure 2.3  Cumulative Employment Change by Industry after 78 
Months of Recovery, for the 2001 Recovery and the Average 
of the Previous Two Recoveries
NOTE: Same as Figure 2.2.
SOURCE: Same as Figure 2.2.
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In other sectors, although employment growth has occurred, it has 
been slower than the average over the last two recoveries that lasted at 
least 78 months. This is true for wholesale and retail trade and even for 
interest rate–sensitive industries, such as construction and fi nancial ac-
tivities. Employment in the wholesale and retail trade sectors is up 5.8 
and 1.5 percent, whereas at the 78-month mark of previous recoveries 
employment had already grown by 13.2 (wholesale) and 18.9 (retail) 
percent. Construction employment grew by 7.2 percent this time, com-
pared to 27.0 percent during the previous recoveries. Financial activi-
ties expanded by 4.9 percent during the current recovery, roughly one-
quarter of the 17.3 percent growth in previous recoveries. Similarly, 
employment in the education and health services sector, where many 
older women are employed, grew at 18.3 percent in the 78 months since 
November 2001, or 57 percent as much as what occurred during earlier 
recoveries.6 
POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS FOR THE 
“CATCH-UP ECONOMY”
Why has the labor market been slow to shift into a higher gear? 
Freeman and Rodgers (2005b) offer some preliminary answers to this 
question. In that work we identify three contributing, although not de-
fi nitive, explanations for the new path of job growth: 1) U.S. perfor-
mance in the international economy, 2) health care costs, and 3) the 
size and composition of the federal government’s fi scal stimulus. The 
following provides an overview of the analysis on which these conclu-
sions are made. 
U.S. Performance in the International Economy
The fi rst factor is the poor performance of the United States in the 
international economy since 2001. The U.S. trade defi cit is the focus of 
the blame for this in the eyes of many analysts and policymakers. In the 
current recovery, the defi cit has risen to levels that are unprecedented 
in our nation’s experience. Table 2.1 illustrates this point. Between the 
fourth quarter of 2001 and the fi rst quarter of 2008, the ratio of ex-
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ports minus imports relative to GDP increased from −4.18 percent to 
−4.24 percent. This is the largest trade defi cit in U.S. economic history. 
However, the defi cit’s growth is not the largest increase on record. In 
the 1980s recovery, the trade defi cit rose from −0.5 percent to −1.32 
percent of GDP.
What is unprecedented is the slowdown in investment growth. In 
previous recoveries, investment fl ows moved in directions that presum-
ably created U.S. jobs. Figure 2.4 compares different components of in-
vestment growth during the current recovery to those of previous recov-
eries. In each category, growth is weaker for the current recovery than 
it was during the average of the four recent recoveries. Most notable 
is the stagnation in nonresidential investment; during the two previous 
Recovery
2001–2008 GDP Exports Imports (X-M)/GDP(%)
2001-4 9,910.0 980.3 1,394.9 −4.18
2008-1 11,693.1 1,483.8 1,979.7 −4.24
2001–2008 1,783.1 503.5 584.8 −0.06
1991–1997
1991-1 7,040.8 563.2 581.5 −0.26
1997-2 8,665.8 941.8 1,034.8 −1.07
1991–1997 1,625.0 378.6 453.3 −0.81
1982–1989
1982-4 5,189.8 285.7 311.4 −0.50
1989-1 6,918.1 485.9 577.2 −1.32
1982–1989 1,728.3 200.2 265.8 −0.82
1961–1967
1961-1 2,491.2 91.6 97.8 −0.25
1967-2 3,464.3 129.3 164.8 −1.02
1961–1967 973.1 37.7 67.0 −0.78
Table 2.1  Trade Balance in the 2001 and Earlier Recoveries, Real Gross 
Domestic Product (billions of chained 2000 dollars)
NOTE: Figures are seasonally adjusted at annual rates.
SOURCE:  Author’s calculations from Bureau of Economic Analysis Table 1.1.6.
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recoveries, this component grew at an average rate of 4.0 percent. Also 
of importance for explaining the slower pace of job growth are shifts in 
foreign direct investment (Figure 2.5). Foreign direct investment (FDI) 
in the United States as a share of GDP barely increased, rising by 0.3 
percent from 2001 to 2006, which is consistent with previous recover-
ies, in which FDI in the United States as a share of GDP grew slightly. 
The drop is predominantly due to a decrease in Europe’s direct invest-
ment in the United States. Also notable is the acceleration in U.S. for-
eign direct investment abroad. During the 1990s recovery, as a share of 
GDP, U.S. foreign direct investment abroad grew by 2.4 percent, while 
during the current business cycle foreign direct investment abroad has 
accelerated by 3.6 percent.
There has recently been a lot of discussion about the signifi cance 
(or lack thereof) of jobs being offshored in the recovery. Unfortunately, 
government statistics do not provide even crude measures of the num-
ber of jobs being offshored in the service industries. For example, while 
Indian exporters report several billion dollars of exports in computer-
related and telecom services and many major U.S. companies proudly 
proclaim offshoring of service-sector work as a way to improve profi ts, 
government statistics record less than a billion dollars of service-sector 
Figure 2.4  Real Private Fixed Investment for the 2001–2007 Recovery 
and the Previous Two Recoveries
SOURCE: Bureau of Economic Analysis.
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imports from India and show them to have been declining over time. 
Meanwhile, BLS surveys record only a small number of job losses at-
tributable to offshoring, in part because the questions about displaced 
workers are not asked in such a way as to obtain the appropriate statis-
tic. The Government Accountability Offi ce (2004) recently examined 
the quality of offi cial statistics and found them to provide little infor-
mation for measuring offshoring’s importance. Freeman and Rodgers’s 
(2005b) review of the existing literature concludes that the Indian sta-
tistics and business announcements indicate that offshoring has cost the 
United States a signifi cant number of jobs.7 
However, attributing the slower pace of growth to trade, investment, 
and offshoring does not provide a complete explanation. The value of 
the dollar fell relative to the euro and the pound, despite rapid increases 
in productivity, and this weak performance by the United States in in-
ternational markets demands a deeper explanation. 
The Impact of Health Care Costs
The second factor behind the slower pace of job growth may be 
the U.S. mode of funding medical insurance. Health insurance spend-
ing per employee has risen sharply in the United States, albeit over a 
Figure 2.5  Change in Foreign Direct Investment in the United States as a 
Share of GDP, Compared with U.S. Direct Investment Abroad
SOURCE: Bureau of Economic Analysis.
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longer period than the current recovery. It adds a substantial marginal 
cost to employing workers, and many fi rms have sought ways to oper-
ate without committing themselves to permanent workers who obtain 
such benefi ts.
The Kaiser Family Foundation fi nds that between 2000 and 2004, 
employment of workers with employer-sponsored health care coverage 
fell by 4.9 percent, which is considerably greater than the overall fall in 
employment for that period. Gould (2004) and others continue to docu-
ment the decline in employer-provided health coverage. This steady de-
cline is consistent with the notion that some of the stagnant employment 
growth may be associated with rising health care costs, and ultimately 
with the country’s approach to fi nancing health insurance. Reber and 
Tyson (2004) also fi nd statistical support for the theory of rising health 
insurance costs acting as a deterrent to employment growth. 
The Impact of the Fiscal Stimulus
The third factor is the nature and composition of the federal govern-
ment’s fi scal stimulus, which gave the bulk of the tax cuts to wealthy 
people, whose propensity to spend quickly is likely to be less than that 
of people on middle incomes and below. Table 2.2 shows that between 
2001 and 2007, the U.S. fi scal defi cit rose by 2.1 percentage points rela-
tive to potential GDP, from a surplus of 1.0 percent to a defi cit of 1.1 
percent. It is almost double the defi cit’s 1.2 percent increase in the 1980s 
recovery. Yet between 2001 and 2007, despite the large stimulus, actual 
real GDP grew by just 18.0 percent—a growth rate approximately equal 
to or smaller than in previous recoveries, which had a fi scal stimulus 
no greater than today’s stimulus. Real GDP grew by 33.3 percent from 
1982 to 1989, by 23.1 percent from 1991 to 1997, and by 39.1 percent 
from 1961 to 1967.
Tax cuts, which in large measure benefi ted the superwealthy, and ex-
penditures on Iraq were two major sources of fi scal stimulus; however, 
each probably had a smaller than hoped for impact on GDP growth. The 
job creation multipliers associated with these fi scal choices are prob-
ably smaller than if the tax cuts had been targeted toward middle- and 
lower-income families and Iraq expenditures had instead been targeted 
toward domestic investment.
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Other Explanations: Structural Change and Productivity Growth
Freeman and Rodgers (2000) reject the idea that increased produc-
tivity explains the new pattern of job growth. This is a circular argument, 
they say. Instead, they contend that increases in productivity stemming 
from technological and other innovations shift the country’s aggregate 
supply curve outward, which increases the growth of potential GDP 
and permits greater growth of employment without infl ation than would 
otherwise be the case.
Some have hypothesized that continuing structural change—i.e., 
the permanent relocation of workers from declining industries to grow-
ing ones—has contributed to the slower pace of growth. Groshen and 
Potter (2003) show that the share of total employment in industries un-
dergoing structural change was 51.0 percent during the mid-1970s and 
1980s recoveries and 57.0 percent during the 1990s recovery; it is 79.0 
percent during the current recovery. Their research suggests that the 
United States is in the middle of a period of reaction to the overexpan-
sion of the 1990s, making structural employment shifts the dominant 
source of changes in employment. 
Table 2.2  The Fiscal Stimulus as a Percentage of Potential GDP for the 
2001 and Earlier Recoveries










NOTE: Figures are the standardized budget surplus or defi cit as a share of potential 
GDP. 
SOURCE: CBO (2006, Appendix F13).
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Linking Industry and Demographic Change
The changing industry distribution of employment from 2001 to 
2007 potentially affects older workers differently than other Americans. 
Older workers (those at least 50 years of age) are concentrated in dif-
ferent industries than younger workers. Employment changes in the 
manufacturing, transportation, public utilities, and education and health 
services sectors are key to understanding the recent employment expe-
riences of older workers.
For the purposes of this analysis, I defi ne an older worker as some-
one between 50 and 64 years of age. I divide this span into three age 
groups: 50 to 54, 55 to 60, and 61 to 64. To describe experiences across 
educational attainment and income, I create two subsamples: older in-
dividuals who have no more than a high school diploma, and older indi-
viduals whose family income puts them in the fi rst (lowest) quartile of 
the family income distribution. I compare the outcomes of older work-
ers in these subpopulations to 16- to 64-year-olds. See Appendix 2A for 
a full description of the data.
Table 2.3 shows the distribution of industry employment in 2001 by 
age and gender. All older men have a strong presence in manufacturing, 
while all women have an extremely strong presence in education and 
health services. Low-income men are less concentrated in manufactur-
ing and more concentrated in trade.
The following two paragraphs describe the industry distributions 
in greater detail. Older men (50+) are concentrated in three industries: 
manufacturing (17.6 percent), trade (15.6 percent), and education and 
health services (18.1 percent). Just over half work in these three sectors. 
An additional one-fi fth work in construction (9.6 percent) and profes-
sional business services (10.6 percent) sectors. Limiting the sample to 
older men with no more than a high school diploma leads to further 
concentration. Nearly 4 in 10 work in manufacturing (21.4 percent) 
and trade (17.7 percent). Adding the men who work in the transporta-
tion and public utilities (12.5 percent) and construction (13.6 percent) 
sectors raises the share to two-thirds. Older low-income men are less 
concentrated in manufacturing than other men: only 15.9 percent work 
in the sector. They have their greatest presence in the trade (21.9 per-
cent) and professional business services sectors (17.3 percent). They 
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Table 2.3  2001 SIC Industry Distributions of Employment, by Age and Gender (%)
Male Female
All 16–64 50+ 50–54 55–59 60–64 16–64 50+ 50–54 55–59 60–64
Mining 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.0 0.8 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1
Construction 12.5 9.6 10.5 9.5 9.7 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.5
Manufacturing 17.7 17.6 19.4 19.2 17.8 9.5 9.7 10.3 10.7 9.2
Transportation and public utilities 9.5 10.3 11.4 11.3 9.5 4.3 3.9 4.4 3.8 3.8
Trade 20.4 15.6 14.2 15.3 16.3 21.4 16.7 14.7 16.1 18.6
Finance, insurance, and real estate 4.7 6.2 5.5 6.2 6.2 7.9 7.9 8.1 8.1 7.5
Professional business services 12.2 10.6 9.9 10.0 10.6 12.7 11.2 10.3 10.8 11.4
Education and health services 13.5 18.1 17.6 17.6 18.6 36.6 41.1 43.2 41.1 39.6
Public 4.7 5.9 6.9 5.9 4.5 4.4 5.7 6.0 5.7 5.3
No more than high school degree 16–64 50+ 50–54 55–59 60–64 16–64 50+ 50–54 55–59 60–64
Mining 1.2 1.3 1.7 1.4 0.9 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1
Construction 17.5 13.6 15.8 13.6 13.7 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.6
Manufacturing 19.8 21.4 24.3 24.2 21.3 12.6 13.7 15.4 16.0 12.0
Transportation and public utilities 9.9 12.5 13.7 13.9 12.1 4.2 4.1 4.8 4.2 3.9
Trade 24.0 17.7 15.8 17.4 18.6 29.3 22.3 20.8 20.7 24.2
Finance, insurance, and real estate 2.1 3.4 2.6 3.1 3.3 7.0 7.5 8.2 7.8 6.7
Professional business services 12.2 11.5 10.6 10.3 11.2 15.2 13.8 12.9 13.7 13.6
Education and health services 5.4 7.4 6.6 7.5 7.8 24.6 29.3 29.5 28.8 29.7
Public 2.6 3.5 3.9 3.2 3.1 3.3 4.7 5.0 4.8 4.6
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Family income in lowest quartile 16–64 50+ 50–54 55–59 60–64 16–64 50+ 50–54 55–59 60–64
Mining 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.5 1.7 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.0
Construction 18.6 15.0 18.0 13.1 13.7 1.3 1.2 1.6 0.8 1.6
Manufacturing 15.6 15.9 15.0 18.8 16.6 8.7 9.1 10.2 11.9 7.5
Transportation and public utilities 6.9 8.8 8.5 9.8 7.1 2.9 3.3 5.1 1.6 2.4
Trade 27.7 21.9 20.9 21.9 20.3 31.7 23.4 21.1 21.4 31.7
Finance, insurance, and real estate 2.9 3.5 2.9 3.4 5.8 4.5 4.3 4.7 4.2 3.6
Professional business services 15.8 17.3 16.8 16.8 19.9 18.3 19.8 21.3 19.3 15.9
Education and health services 9.9 13.7 13.8 13.1 12.4 30.2 36.0 33.9 38.3 33.3
Public 1.8 2.9 3.2 1.8 2.5 2.2 2.7 2.0 2.4 4.0
NOTE: The columns are the share of a particular group in each industry. “All” corresponds to all men at least 18 years of age that work in 
either the public or the private sector. Agriculture is the remaining industry share. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from the 2001 Outgoing Rotation Group CPS fi le.  
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also have a strong presence in construction and in education and health 
services.
Older women have different industry distributions than older men. 
They are concentrated in wholesale and retail trade (16.7 percent) and 
heavily concentrated in the education and health services sector (41.1 
percent): 57.8 percent of older women work in these two industries. 
This estimate falls to 51.6 percent when we limit the sample to older 
women with no more than a high school diploma, and it jumps back up 
to 59.4 percent when we focus on older low-income women.
We translate these patterns into expected shifts in demand for a de-
mographic group’s employment by computing a fi xed weight index of 
the potential shift in employment for a group. To do this, we multiply 
each group’s 2001 industry employment share by its industry employ-
ment growth from 2001 to 2007. We then sum the products to obtain a 
weighted average growth of employment.
Table 2.4 reports these expected shifts. For 16- to 64-year-old men, 
the shift that is due to changes in employment ranges from increases of 
1.9 percent for all men and low-income men to a small increase of 0.4 
percent for less-educated men for the years 2001–2007. The main reason 
for the stagnation is the concentration in the manufacturing sector for 
less-educated men. Men with no more than a high school diploma have 
the smallest expected increases in employment. Among these men, the 
expected increase is smallest for 50- to 54- and 55- to 59-year-old men. 
The small increase is due to their overrepresentation in manufacturing 
and in transportation and public utilities. Thirty-eight percent of 50- to 
54-year-old men are employed in these two sectors. The 0.4 percent 
increase for less-educated 60- to 64-year-old men is also due to their 
overrepresentation in these two sectors. 
For older women, the fi xed-weight industry growth calculations sug-
gest employment increases for most age and education groups. All have 
a large presence in the education and health services sector. The varia-
tion in their expected employment gains is due to their varying pres-
ence in the manufacturing sector. In 2001, 9.7 percent of older women 
were in manufacturing, compared to 13.7 percent of less-educated older 
women and 9.1 percent of low-income older women. Women 50 and 
over were predicted to have an 8.9 percent decrease in employment. 
Older less-educated women have a predicted 3.9 percent increase and 
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older low-income women have a 5.9 percent increase in employment. 
Across age, the expected employment patterns are similar.
THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE “CATCH UP” ECONOMY ON 
OLDER AMERICANS
Do the losses for men and the gains for women shown in the fi xed-
weight analysis translate into changes in labor force attachment? Do 
they translate into changes in benefi t coverage? Before answering these 
Male 16–64 50+ 50–54 55–59 60–64 65+
All 1.9 2.7 2.6 2.3 2.6 3.8
No more than high school degree 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.0 0.5 1.9
Family income in lowest quartile 1.9 2.7 3.1 1.8 2.9 3.0
Female
All 17.3 −8.9 9.4 0.9 12.8 15.2
No more than high school degree 2.9 3.9 3.8 3.6 4.1 4.8
Family income in lowest quartile 4.3 5.9 5.7 5.8 4.9 7.1
NOTE: Entries are constructed by multiplying a demographic group’s 2001 industry 
employment shares (Table 2.8) by the industry’s percentage employment growth from 
2001 to 2006 and summing the products to obtain a weighted average growth of em-
ployment in the industries that employed the group. Industry employment growth is 
the difference from 2001 to 2006. In 2003 the industry codes changed. To link 2001 
with 2006, we had to make several assumptions. The following is a list of the 2001 
SIC (2003 SIC) codes. If an industry shown in Table 2.8 is not listed below, a direct 
match was able to be made: Transportation (Transportation and Warehousing), Com-
munication and Public Utilities (Information), Utility and Sanitary Services (Utili-
ties), Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate (Financial Activities), Entertainment and 
Recreation (Leisure and Hospitality), Professional and Business Services (Personal 
services including private households, business, auto, and repair services; Personal 
services excluding private households), Education and Health Services (Hospitals, 
medical services, except hospitals, educational services, social services), Other Pro-
fessional Services (Other Services).
a This assumes that 2001 industry shares and actual CES employment change.
SOURCE: Author’s tabulations of Current Employment Statistics data from the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics at www.bls.gov.
Table 2.4  Expected Change in Employment by Age, 2001–2007 (%)a
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questions, I present an economic portrait of older Americans. The pic-
ture that emerges is one of not only current economic vulnerability, but 
of potential long-term economic vulnerability for individuals in the fi rst 
(lowest) quartile of family income. Older low-income men and women 
have weaker labor force attachments than either the general population 
of 16- to 64-year-olds or other low-income 16- to 64-year-olds. Their 
benefi t coverage rates are lower than the general population; how-
ever, they do exceed the rates of all low-income individuals. Older less-
educated men and women are not at as great an economic risk as low-
income men and women. Their labor force attachment and benefi t lev-
els are higher. 
To develop this portrait in greater detail, Table 2.5 fi rst reports sum-
mary statistics on years of schooling and potential experience for each 
category of men and women. As expected, older men and women, in-
dependent of education and income, have accumulated more years of 
experience. They also have fewer accumulated years of schooling than 
the general population. Still, the greater potential experience of older 
men and women should serve as a benefi t during times of economic 
growth, even for less-educated and low-income men and women. For 
the latter, their greater experience should help to offset the adverse ef-
fects of their limited schooling. In sectors where internal labor markets 
exist, the experience of older workers should help to insulate them from 
fl uctuations in the macroeconomy.
Table 2.6 presents employment-population ratios plus outcomes 
for four additional economic and social measures: hours worked per 
week, full-year work, private health insurance coverage, and pension 
coverage. The key result in this table is that older low-income men and 
women have weaker labor force attachments than all other 16- to 64-
year-olds and than other low-income 16- to 64-year-olds. Their benefi t 
coverage rates are lower than the general population, but they do ex-
ceed the coverage rates of low-income 16- to 64-year-olds.
Other notable trends in the table are that attachment falls as we move 
across age groups. It is important to see that all of the attachment mea-
sures at ages 50 to 54 exceed the measures for the general population. 
For example, 82.6 percent of 50- to 54-year-old men work full-year, 
compared to 73.8 percent of 16- to 64-year-old men. For 55- to 60-year-
old men, this 82.6 percent fi gure falls to 74.2 percent, and it falls further, 
to 56.9 percent, for 61- to 64-year-old men. Attachment among similarly 
Rodgers chapter.indd   30 9/10/2008   1:30:01 PM
Consequences of Recent Job Growth on Older Low Income Workers   31
aged men and women is uniformly lower among less-educated and lower-
income men and women than among the general population. 
The biggest gaps in attachment exist between low-income men 
and women and the general population. In 2006, 51.4 percent of low-
income 50- to 54-year-olds worked full-year, compared to 82.6 percent 
of all 50- to 54-year-old men, generating a 31.2-point gap in attach-
ment. A 28.5-point gap even exists among women: 40.7 versus 69.2 
percent. Even at ages 61 to 64, gaps in attachment are substantial.
The weaker attachment of men and women in the lowest quartile of 
the family income distribution extends to benefi ts. Between 40.0 and 
46.1 percent of older low-income men have private health insurance 











16–64 12.8 19.7 13.0 19.7
50–54 13.4 32.4 13.4 32.5
55–60 13.6 37.4 13.2 37.7
61–64 13.1 42.8 12.7 43.2
No more than high school degree 
16–64 10.6 24.6 10.7 27.9
50–54 10.8 35.0 10.9 35.0
55–60 10.8 40.2 10.9 40.1
61–64 10.6 45.4 10.8 45.2
Real family income in lowest fi rst quartile
16–64 11.4 18.6 11.7 19.3
50–54 11.5 34.3 11.7 34.2
55–60 11.7 39.3 11.6 39.4
61–64 11.5 44.6 11.4 44.7
NOTE: The sample consists of individuals that are at least 16 years of age and are 
white, black, or Hispanic. Individuals with no more than a high school degree either 
have only high school diplomas or GEDs or are high school dropouts. An individual’s 
years of schooling are constructed using the method proposed in Jaeger (2003). “Po-
tential experience” equals: age − years of schooling − 6.
SOURCE: Author’s tabulations from the microdata of the March Annual Demographic 
Files of the Current Population Survey. 
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Table 2.6  2004 Labor Market Outcomes of Older Workers by Age, 












16–64 0.782 32.5 0.686 0.734 0.723 0.449
50–54 0.835 36.6 0.778 0.817 0.796 0.574
55–60 0.754 32.0 0.678 0.736 0.781 0.550
61–64 0.562 22.7 0.464 0.559 0.737 0.524
No more than a high school degree
16–64 0.711 28.4 0.610 0.640 0.615 0.322
50–54 0.770 32.5 0.711 0.749 0.689 0.465
55–60 0.681 28.2 0.615 0.652 0.679 0.457
61–64 0.490 19.5 0.410 0.474 0.631 0.448
Real family income in lowest (fi rst) quartile
16–64 0.534 0.392 0.156
50–54 0.460 0.404 0.220
55–60 0.440 0.456 0.206












16–64 0.673 24.1 0.491 0.596 0.721 0.421
50–54 0.737 28.0 0.587 0.686 0.784 0.556
55–60 0.643 23.7 0.490 0.605 0.754 0.537
61–64 0.453 15.3 0.304 0.430 0.714 0.469
No more than a high school degree
16–64 0.582 20.0 0.403 0.410 0.583 0.300
50–54 0.651 24.0 0.508 0.592 0.672 0.458
55–60 0.568 20.1 0.423 0.512 0.647 0.447
61–64 0.395 12.8 0.256 0.372 0.629 0.422
Real family income in lowest (fi rst) quartile
16–64 0.405 0.367 0.165
50–54 0.371 0.393 0.262
55–60 0.315 0.431 0.267
61–64 0.243 0.483 0.234
NOTE: To be included in the sample, an individual had to be at least 16 years of age. 
EPOP (employment-to-population ratio), hours, and full-time work come from the 
ORG. All other outcomes come from the Annual Demographic Files. Blank = not 
applicable.
SOURCE: Author’s tabulations from the Outgoing Rotation Group (ORG) and March 
Annual Demographic Files of the Current Population Survey. 
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coverage. The rates for older men as a whole range from 73.9 to 78.7 
percent. Even among older men with no more than a high school de-
gree, more than two-thirds of them have health insurance. A similar 
pattern exists among women: the estimates on pension coverage reveal 
substantial differences between low-income men and women and the 
general population. More than a fi fth of older low-income men and just 
under 40 percent of older low-income women are employed in fi rms 
that offer pension plans to their employees; these fi gures are around 55 
percent for all male and female 16- to 64-year-olds and 60 percent for 
all older men and women (not shown). Shifting to who actually has an 
employer-provided pension reduces these fi gures, especially for low-
income men and women. Approximately one-fi fth of older low-income 
men and one-quarter of older low-income women have an employer-
provided pension, compared to one-half of all older men and women 
and 41–44 percent of older men and women with no more than a high 
school degree (Table 2.6).
The Current Business Cycle: A Period of Growing 
Economic Insecurity?
I now describe the extent to which the slower pace of job growth 
during the current business cycle has led to greater economic insecurity 
for older workers, with a focus on low-income and less-educated indi-
viduals. The story that emerges is that during the 2001–2006 period, 
50- to 54-year-old men and women experienced a consistent pattern of 
stagnation in attachment and decline in benefi ts.
Tables 2.7–2.9 report the analysis for full-year work, employer-pro-
vided health insurance, and pension coverage. On balance, the indicators 
suggest increased labor market insecurity among low-income 50- to 54-
year-old men and women, with some evidence of a decline among men 
with no more than a high school degree. Full-year work stagnated for all 
50- to 54-year-old low-income men and women. Private sector health 
insurance coverage declined for all older men and women. The sharpest 
drop occurred among men and women with no more than a high school 
degree. For example, the coverage of 50- to 54-year-old less-educated 
men and women fell 3.9 and 4.4 points, respectively. The fall in cover-
age for 50- to 54-year-old low-income men and women was 3.1 and 2.1 
points.
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Men were particularly affected by a decrease in the share of fi rms 
that offer pension plans. Coverage trended downward for 50- to 54-
year-olds and 55- to 59-year-olds. The decline among 50- to 54-year-
olds is measured with the greatest precision. No systematic pattern of 
change exists for older women. The actual holding of a fi rm-provided 
pension fell among older men. Less-educated and low-income men 
were affected, but a decline also occurred in the general male popula-
tion. Women’s actual holding of pensions remained unchanged.
Is Growing Economic Insecurity a New Feature of Recoveries?
I now place the 2001 to 2006 erosions in attachment and benefi ts 
into a broader historical context. Are they a part of the recent path of 
slower job growth, potentially caused by the United States’ performance 
in the international economy, increase in health care costs, and federal 
fi scal policy choices? To answer this question, I compare changes in our 
list of outcomes during the current business cycle to previous business 
cycles. If attachment and benefi ts typically rose during past recover-
ies, then the slower pace of job growth has been powerful enough to 
reduce the ability of older workers’ greater labor market experience to 
fully insulate them from job losses. I fi nd that the recent stagnation in 
low-income men and women’s labor force attachment as well as their 
declines in benefi ts differs from previous recoveries. During the 1980s 
and 1990s recoveries, attachment and benefi t levels did not fall.
Tables 2.7–2.9 report changes in the percentage of respondents that 
worked full-year, had private health insurance, and had pension cover-
age during the current and two previous recoveries. The fi gures in Table 
2.7 for full-year work suggest that a break from previous recoveries has 
occurred for less-educated and low-income men and women. During 
the 1980s and 1990s recovery, full-year work among 50- to 54-year-old 
men and women typically increased, while it has remained unchanged 
during the current business cycle.
Recent patterns of job growth are associated with trends in older 
workers’ private health insurance and pension coverage. Tables 2.8 and 
2.9 report that employer-provided benefi ts have fallen. The drop in cov-
erage has been greatest among less-educated men and women. More 
specifi cally, from 1991 to 1996 employer-provided health insurance 
coverage increased or remained the same. During the current recovery, 
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All No more than high school degree Family income in fi rst quartile
Men
Age group 1982–87 1991–96 2001–06 1982–87 1991–96 2001–06 1982–87 1991–96 2001–06
50–54 0.033 0.020 −0.002 0.027 0.033 −0.010 0.019 0.021 −0.002
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.021) (0.020) (0.008)
55–59 0.006 0.015 0.003 0.019 0.022 −0.023 −0.018 0.055 0.003
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.021) (0.020) (0.008)
60–64 −0.024 0.008 0.020 −0.025 −0.012 0.012 −0.030 −0.020 0.020
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.021) (0.020) (0.008)
Women
Age group 1982–87 1991–96 2001–06 1982–87 1991–96 2001–06 1982–87 1991–96 2001–06
50–54 0.071 0.045 0.000 0.055 0.029 −0.019 0.034 0.005 0.000
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.021) (0.020) (0.008)
55–59 0.043 0.031 0.013 0.038 0.018 −0.007 0.067 −0.012 0.013
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.021) (0.020) (0.008)
60–64 0.006 0.037 0.028 0.007 0.028 0.026 −0.015 0.012 0.028
Table 2.7  Change in Share of Workers Working Full-Year by Recovery
NOTE: The columns correspond to the current and two previous recoveries: 1982–1987, 1991–1996, and 2001–2006. All respondents are 
men and women that are at least 16 years of age. Figures in parentheses are standard errors.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations from the microdata of the March Annual Demographic Files of the Current Population Survey.
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the decline in coverage has occurred not only among low-income men 
and women, but also those with no more than a high school degree.
With respect to pensions, the share of older individuals included in 
pension plans either remained the same or increased during the 1990s 
recovery. Coverage fell during the current business cycle. During the 
1990s recovery, there was little relationship between men’s pensions 
and job growth, but since 2001 the share of fi rms that offer plans has 
fallen. The decline has been among 50- to 54- and 55- to 59-year-old 
men. Women’s pension coverage seems to have a different relation to 
the macroeconomy. Coverage increased during the 1990s by 4.6 points. 
Women with no more than a high school degree also saw their cover-
All
No more than a 
high school degree
Family income 
in fi rst quartile
Men
Age group 1991–96 2001–06 1991–96 2001–06 1991–96 2001–06
50–54 0.002 −0.031 −0.003 −0.039 0.009 −0.031
 (0.010) (0.008) (0.016) (0.014) (0.029) (0.008)
55–59 0.025 −0.020 0.022 −0.054 0.076 −0.020
 (0.012) (0.009) (0.017) (0.015) (0.030) (0.009)
60–64 −0.035 −0.004 −0.045 −0.003 −0.071 −0.004
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.017) (0.017) (0.028) (0.011)
Women
Age group 1991–96 2001–06 1991–96 2001–06 1991–96 2001–06
50–54 0.036 −0.021 0.020 −0.044 0.030 −0.021
 (0.011) (0.008) (0.015) (0.014) (0.029) (0.008)
55–59 0.003 −0.005 −0.029 −0.042 −0.033 −0.005
 (0.012) (0.009) (0.015) (0.015) (0.027) (0.009)
60–64 −0.001 0.000 0.000 −0.007 −0.003 0.000
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.015) (0.015) (0.024) (0.011)
Table 2.8  Change in Share of Workers Having Private-Sector Health 
Insurance by Recovery
NOTE: The columns correspond to the previous and current recoveries of 1991–1996 
and 2001–2006. All respondents are men and women that are at least 16 years of age. 
Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
SOURCE: Author’s calculations from the microdata of the March Annual Demographic 
Files of the Current Population Survey. 
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age rate jump by 2.7 points. During the current recovery, the growth in 
coverage has fallen for older women in these age groups.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In recent work, Freeman and Rodgers (2005a) and Rodgers and 
Freeman (2006) found that the slower pace of job growth has had an 
adverse impact on the employment outcomes of blacks, Latinos, and 
youth. These fi ndings should not be too surprising. A large literature has 
NOTE: The columns correspond to the previous and current recoveries of 1991–1996 
and 2001–2006. All respondents are men and women that are at least 16 years of age. 
Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
SOURCE: Author’s calculations from the microdata of the March Annual Demographic 
Files of the Current Population Survey.
All
No more than a 
high school degree
Family income 
in fi rst quartile
Men
Age group 1991–96 2001–06 1991–96 2001–06 1991–96 2001–06
50–54 0.011 −0.052 0.002 −0.036 0.009 −0.031
 (0.012) (0.009) (0.018) (0.015) (0.029) (0.008)
55–59 −0.011 −0.016 0.003 −0.056 0.076 −0.020
 (0.014) (0.011) (0.019) (0.018) (0.030) (0.009)
60–64 0.005 −0.011 0.014 −0.032 −0.071 −0.004
 (0.017) (0.015) (0.023) (0.022) (0.028) (0.011)
Women
Age group 1991–96 2001–06 1991–96 2001–06 1991–96 2001–06
50–54 0.046 −0.026 0.027 −0.023 0.030 −0.021
 (0.013) (0.010) (0.018) (0.016) (0.029) (0.008)
55–59 0.051 0.025 0.012 −0.003 −0.033 −0.005
 (0.016) (0.012) (0.020) (0.019) (0.027) (0.009)
60–64 0.000 −0.018 0.012 −0.004 −0.003 0.000
 (0.019) (0.016) (0.023) (0.022) (0.024) (0.011)
Table 2.9  Change in Share of Workers Having a Pension, by Recovery 
and Expansion
Rodgers chapter.indd   37 9/10/2008   1:30:03 PM
38   Rodgers
demonstrated the greater sensitivity of these demographic groups’ labor 
market outcomes to the macroeconomy.8
This chapter shows that the slower pace of job growth has even af-
fected older workers. Job growth during the recovery has not been large 
enough to offset the adverse impact of the structural increases in dis-
placement that have occurred over the past two decades. Low-income 
men and women who already have weaker labor force attachment, lower 
private health insurance and pension coverage rates saw the greatest 
erosions in their economic security. Unlike youth, who have longer 
time horizons to recoup losses, older workers have fewer years, even if 
they choose to extend their working careers past the age of 65. To my 
knowledge, employment and wage losses for this recovery have not 
been estimated, but for earlier periods Chan and Stevens (2001, 2004), 
Kletzer and Fairlie (2003), and others have found that older displaced 
workers experienced major reductions in income even if they were able 
to return to the labor market. Future work should compare the CPS Dis-
placed Worker Surveys for 2001–2006 to earlier surveys.
The slower pace of job growth poses a challenge to economic and 
social policy. As long as the United States makes full employment its 
main source of economic protection for workers, the job market has 
to attain something similar to the late 1990s labor market tightness for 
economic growth to be broadly shared. But given the weaker labor 
force attachment, and the lower health insurance and pension coverage 
rates of older low-income and less-educated Americans, even a return 
to the 1990s tightness may not be enough to signifi cantly improve their 
prospects for greater economic security. Stronger job growth is only a 
fi rst step to offsetting the secular increase in the displacement of older 
workers. Additional public policy answers are needed to ensure that 
older Americans—particularly low-income Americans—can achieve 
economic security in the future.
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Appendix 2A
This study uses several data sets. The fi rst is made up of the published 
monthly employment fi gures from the establishment-level Current Employ-
ment Statistics (CES). The monthly time series used in the analysis spans from 
February 1961 to April 2008, covering fi ve boom, bust, and recovery episodes. 
We use the NBER dating committee’s designations to identify the episodes. 
The microdata comes from the annual Merged Outgoing Rotation Group Files 
of the Current Population Survey (1979 to 2006). We use the data fi les pro-
duced by Unicon Research Corporation. However, this gain in heterogeneity 
comes with costs. Because the fi les start in 1979, we can only document the 
recovery of the 1974-to-1984 episode. Furthermore, the annual nature of the 
data means that we can only approximate the recovery and boom episodes, 
which are 1982 to 1987, 1982 to 1989, 1991 to 1996, 1991 to 2000, and 2001 
to 2006. 
The samples are composed of all black, white, and Hispanic men and 
women that are 16 to 64 years of age. Three subsamples of older individu-
als are created: 50 to 54 years old, 55 to 60 years old, and 60 to 64 years old. 
The less-educated sample consists of men and women who have completed 
no more than a high school degree. The low-income subsample is composed 
of men and women aged 50 and older whose family income is in the lowest 
quartile of the family income distribution.
The employment-population ratio is the ratio of the number of employed to 
the sum of the number looking for work, the number working, the number with 
a job but not working, and all those who are out of the labor force. The ratio is 
constructed from the MLR (Monthly Labor Force Recode) variable in the Uni-
con Research Corporation CPS Utilities fi les.1 In these fi les, the variable has 
been made consistent across time to refl ect changes in the question. We use the 
MLR variable to construct the employment-population ratio. This is the share 
of the civilian population that is employed. In a period of weak job growth, it 
has the benefi t of capturing both the longer time it takes to fi nd a job (unem-
ployment) and decisions to leave the labor force (labor force participation).
A third data source is the annual demographic fi les from the March Cur-
rent Population Survey (1963 to 2006), also available from Unicon Research 
Corporation. We use these data to describe patterns in full-year work, private 
health insurance coverage, and pension coverage. For example, the 2005 fi le 
contains information on weeks worked for calendar year 2004. To describe 
annual labor force attachment, we construct the percentage of respondents that 
worked a full year (at least 39 weeks). 
39
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The fi les start in 1963, and, with the combination of information available 
to construct detailed Hispanic measures, we are able to roughly describe two 
boom and three recovery episodes: boom episodes 1982 to 1989 and 1991 to 
2000, and recovery episodes 1982 to 1987, 1991 to 1996 and 2001 to 2006. We 
chose the recovery lengths to match the current length of the recovery and the 
availability of data.2 
Appendix Notes
 1. The original location, length, and name are as follows: 1994 to 2003 (180, 2, 
PEMLR), 1989 to 1993 (348, 1, A-LFSR), and 1979 to 1988 (109, 1, ESR).
 2. These three recovery episodes (also mentioned in Table 2.7) end a year earlier than 
the three recovery periods given in endnote 6 because for that series more recent 
data was available.
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Notes
A version of this chapter originally was presented at the National Academy of Social 
Insurance’s eighteenth annual conference, “Older and Out of Work: Jobs and Social 
Insurance for a Changing Economy,” January 19, 2006. It is published here with the 
permission of the National Academy of Social Insurance.
 1.  The National Bureau of Economic Research has designated November 2001 
as the start of the recovery. As of April 2008, the economy was in its seventy-
eighth month of expansion. Job creation still signifi cantly lagged behind historical 
growth.
  2.  Excluding the months of September 2005 to May 2006 (i.e., the nine-month peri-
od following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita) raises the average monthly job growth 
to 120,000 for the period from August 2003 to April 2008.
 3.  For most of 2005, the national unemployment rate ranged from 4.9 to 5.1 percent. 
During this period, the employment-population ratio was 62.7 percent. In 1997, 
in the midst of the 1990s recovery, the unemployment rate fell to between 4.9 and 
5.1 percent. At that time, over 8 million jobs had been created. As a result, the 
employment-population ratio was 63.8 percent. 
 4.  These increases translate into 5.3 percent growth for the current recovery, 13.2 
percent for the 1990s recovery, 21.4 percent for the 1980s recovery, and 18.7 per-
cent for the early 1970s recovery. Percentages are derived from author tabulations 
of the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Current Employment Statistics (CES) employer 
survey. 
  5. The number of manufacturing jobs fell from 15,825,000 in November 2001 to 
13,596,000 in April 2008, a decline of 2,229,000. 
 6. The slow jobs recovery shows some variation across states. Looking at the past 
three recoveries—2001 to 2007, 1991 to 1997, and 1982 to 1988—average state 
employment growth was 15.1 and 16.9 percent in the fi rst two recoveries, while 
during the current recovery employment has stagnated, growing at only 5.7 
percent.
 7. Estimates from business groups of offshoring’s impact are as high as 400,000 jobs 
per year, which would make offshoring a major contributor to the recovery’s being 
weaker than expected.
  8. See, for example, Cherry and Rodgers (2000) for studies that document the ben-
efi ts of the low unemployment rates of the 1990s on minorities and youth. Earlier 
studies reached the same conclusions: Clark and Summers (1981) found this to 
be the case in their time series study of the relationship of youth joblessness and 
employment to adult unemployment. Freeman (1991) fi nds similar results using 
cross-area variation in youth employment and earnings in the 1980s. For a survey 
on estimates for the 1960s and 1970s, see DeFreitas (1986). For more recent work, 
see DeFreitas (1991), Freeman and Holzer (1986), Myers (1989), Stratton (1993), 
and Farber (1997). Studies that use various waves of the displaced-worker survey 
also examine this issue: see, for example, Kletzer (1991) and Hipple (1997).
 
Rodgers chapter.indd   41 9/10/2008   1:30:04 PM
42   Rodgers
References
Chan, Sewin, and Ann H. Stevens. 2001. “Job Loss and Employment Patterns 
of Older Workers.” Journal of Labor Economics 19(2): 484–521.
———. 2004. “How Does Job Loss Affect the Timing of Retirement?” 
Contributions to Economic Analysis and Policy 3(1): 1187.
Cherry, Robert, and William M. Rodgers III, eds. 2000. Prosperity for All? 
The Economic Boom and African Americans. New York: Russell Sage 
Foundation.
Clark, Kim B., and Lawrence H. Summers. 1981. “Demographic Differences 
in Cyclical Employment Variation.” Journal of Human Resources 16(1): 
61–79.
Congressional Budget Offi ce (CBO). 2006. The Budget and Economic Outlook: 
Fiscal Years 2007 to 2016. A CBO Study. Washington, DC: CBO.
DeFreitas, Gregory. 1986. “A Time-Series Analysis of Hispanic Employment.” 
Journal of Human Resources 21(1): 24–43.
———. 1991. Inequality at Work: Hispanics in the U.S. Labor Force. New 
York: Oxford University Press.
Farber, Henry S. 1997. “The Changing Face of Job Loss in the United States, 
1981–1995.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics 
(1997): 55–128.
Freeman, Richard B. 1991. “Employment and Earnings of Disadvantaged 
Young Men in a Labor Shortage Economy.” In The Urban Underclass, 
Christopher Jencks and Paul E. Peterson, eds. Washington, DC: Brookings 
Institution, pp. 103–121.
Freeman, Richard B., and Harry J. Holzer, eds. 1986. The Black Youth 
Employment Crisis. National Bureau of Economic Research Project Report. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Freeman, Richard B., and William M. Rodgers III. 2000. “Area Economic 
Conditions and the Labor Market Outcomes of Young Men in the 1990s 
Expansion.” In Prosperity for All? The Economic Boom and African 
Americans, Robert Cherry and William M. Rodgers III, eds. New York: 
Russell Sage Foundation, pp. 50–87.
———. 2005a. The Fragility of the 1990s Economic Gains. Washington, DC: 
Center for American Progress.
———. 2005b. “The Weak Jobs Recovery: Whatever Happened to ‘the Great 
American Jobs Machine’?” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic 
Policy Review 11(1): 3–18.
Gardner, Jennifer M. 1995. “Worker Displacement: A Decade of Change,” 
Monthly Labor Review 118(4): 45–57.
Gonzalez, Arturo. 2002. The Impact of the 2001/2002 Economic Recession on 
Rodgers chapter.indd   42 9/10/2008   1:30:04 PM
Consequences of Recent Job Growth on Older Low Income Workers   43
Hispanic Workers: A Cross-Sectional Comparison of Three Generations. 
Washington, DC: Pew Hispanic Center.
Gould, Elise. 2004. The Chronic Problem of Declining Health Coverage: 
Employer-provided Health Insurance Falls for Third Consecutive Year. EPI 
Issue Brief No. 202. Washington, DC: Economic Policy Institute.
Government Accountability Offi ce (GAO). 2004. International Trade: Current 
Government Data Provide Limited Insight into Offshoring of Services. 
Report to Congressional Requesters. GAO-04-932. Washington, DC: GAO.
Groshen, Erica L., and Simon Potter. 2003. “Has Structural Change Contributed 
to a Jobless Recovery?” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Current Issues 
in Economics and Finance 9(8): 1–7.
Hipple, Steven. 1997. “Worker Displacement in an Expanding Economy.” 
Monthly Labor Review 120(12): 26–39.
Jaeger, David A. 2003. “Estimating the Returns to Education Using the Newest 
Current Population Survey Education Questions.” Economic Letters 78(3): 
385–394.
Kletzer, Lori G. 1991. “Job Displacement, 1979–86: How Blacks Fared 
Relative to Whites.” Monthly Labor Review 114(7): 17–25.
Kletzer, Lori G., and Robert W. Fairlie. 2003. “The Long-Term Costs of Job 
Displacement for Young Adult Workers.” Industrial and Labor Relations 
Review 56(4): 682–698.
Kochhar, Rakesh. 2003. Jobs Lost, Jobs Gained: The Latino Experience in the 
Recession and Recovery. Washington, DC: Pew Hispanic Center.
Myers, Samuel L. 1989. “How Voluntary is Black Unemployment and Black 
Labor Force Withdrawal?” In The Question of Discrimination: Racial 
Inequality in the U.S. Labor Market, Steven Shulman and William Darity 
Jr., eds. Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, pp. 81–108.
Peracchi, Franco, and Finis Welch. 1994. “Trends in Labor Force Transitions 
of Older Men and Women.” Journal of Labor Economics 12(2): 210–242.
Reber, Sarah, and Laura D’Andrea Tyson. 2004. “Rising Health Insurance 
Costs Slow Job Growth and Reduce Wages and Job Quality.” Unpublished 
manuscript. University of California, Los Angeles, and London Business 
School.
Rodgers, William M. III, and Richard B. Freeman. 2006. How Have Hispanics 
Fared in the “Jobless Recovery”? Washington, DC: Center for American 
Progress.
Rodriguez, Daniel, and Madeline Zavodny. 2003. “Changes in the Age and 
Education Profi le of Displaced Workers.” Industrial and Labor Relations 
Review 56(3): 498–510.
Stratton, Leslie S. 1993. “Racial Differences in Men’s Unemployment.” 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review 46(3): 451–463.
Rodgers chapter.indd   43 9/10/2008   1:30:04 PM
44   Rodgers
Suro, Roberto, and B. Lindsay Lowell. 2002. New Lows from New Highs: 
Latino Economic Losses in the Current Recession. Washington, DC: Pew 
Hispanic Center.
Van Horn, Carl, William M. Rodgers III, Neil Ridley, and Laurie M. 
Harrington. 2005. Getting Back to Work: New Public/Private Strategies for 
Laid-Off American Workers. New Brunswick, NJ: John J. Heldrich Center 
for Workforce Development, Edward J. Bloustein School of Planning and 
Public Policy, Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey.
Rodgers chapter.indd   44 9/10/2008   1:30:04 PM
Older and Out of Work
Jobs and Social Insurance 





W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
Kalamazoo, Michigan
Eberts & Hobbie.indb   3 7/25/2008   9:43:14 AM
© 2008
National Academy of Social Insurance
1776 Massachusetts Ave. N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
Older and Out of Work: Jobs and Social Insurance for a Changing Economy
may be ordered from
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
300 S. Westnedge Avenue
Kalamazoo, Michigan 49007-4686
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Older and out of work : jobs and social insurance for a changing economy / Randall 
W. Eberts, Richard A. Hobbie, editors.
  p. cm.
 Includes bibliographical references and index.
 ISBN-13: 978-0-88099-329-6 (pbk. : alk. paper)
 ISBN-10: 0-88099-329-4 (pbk. : alk. paper)
 ISBN-13: 978-0-88099-330-2 (hardcover : alk. paper)
 ISBN-10: 0-88099-330-8 (hardcover : alk. paper)
 1. Older people—Employment—United States. 2. Age and employment—United 




The facts presented in this study and the observations and viewpoints expressed are 
the sole responsibility of the authors. They do not necessarily represent positions 
of the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research or the National Academy of 
Social Insurance.
Cover design by Alcorn Publication Design.
Index prepared by Diane Worden.
Printed in the United States of America.
Printed on recycled paper.
Eberts & Hobbie.indb   4 7/25/2008   9:43:14 AM
